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dren of tender age. Accord, Balser v. Young, 72 Pa. Super. 502
(1919). Protruding nails in a lumber pile were the dangerous
element in Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So.2d 729 (1953). In
Frye v. Elrod, 187 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 884 (1938), the court avoided
the problem and submitted the issue of attractive nuisance to the
jury who found for the plaintiff. Accord, Gimmestad v. Rose
Bros. Co., 194 Mfinn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935).
The REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934) has apparently enlarged
the attractive nuisane doctrine and thereby has created greater
liability to the land owner. The rule proposed by § 339 has been
discussed and at least partially applied in Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123
Conn. 110, 193 Atl. 608 (1937). See also, Prosser, Torts § 77 (1st
ed. 1941) where this writer approves of the rule.
The non-applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine in the
principal case appears to be a sound "business" decision recognizing both the practical consequences in a commercial economy
and the weight of authority on the subject.
If the attractive nuisance doctrine was indiscriminately applied
in these cases the landowner would become an insurer for trespassing clildren. This burden is of no little importance as many
landowners may never know the physical condition of their
lands. Should they be forced to keep the condition of their property safe for trespassers, or protect themselves by purchasing
indemnity insurance is the real issue. If the doctrine is accepted
in its widest sense the landowner is an insurer of trespassing children, if totally rejected he is clothed with a full defense against
children who may not recognize danger hidden or visible. Since
some middle ground is needed, acceptance of an attractive nuisance doctrine with a delimiting factor of the "inherently dangerous object" is desired. Whether an object is inherently dangerous
is now a categorical question of law in most jurisdictions and
hence removed from the jury prejudiced by a child's injury.
J. Robert Geiman
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THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM. By Henry M.
Hart, Jr.' and Herbert Wechsler.2 Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1953. Pp. xi, 1445. $11.00. The federal judicial system

I Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School.
2 Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
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of the United States poses many problems which are non-existent
in judicial systems of most other countries. In addition to a substantial body of law which has grown out of the relationship of
the federal courts to the state courts in the exercise of jurisdiction,
there are a vast number of cases which have been decided in federal courts in the administration of federal laws. These factors tend
to make our federal court system both unique and complex.
Messrs. Hart and Wechsler deal with the problems which arise
under this system in their book.
The Federal Courts and the Federal System is a combination
case-text-reference book. Its 1400 plus pages contain an excellent
treatment of the pertinent judicial decisions, historical background
on the development of the federal judicial system, and many
thought provoking questions on the subject matter of each of its
eleven chapters. However, the authors have chosen not to consider
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this book because they
consider these as a topic for separate treatment.
The book begins with excerpts from the Constitution on the
judicial power of the United States and from skillfully arranged
portions of the history of the Constitutional Convention which
throw considerable light on the framers' intent in drafting these
articles. Farrand and Warren are among the widely known authorities whose works are quoted on this subject. Portions of the
Federalist papers and a note on the organization and growth of
the federal judicial system are also included in this chapter.
Chapter II, the Nature of the Federal Judicial Functions: Case
and Controversies, highlights the celebrated case, Marbury v.
Madison.3 The note accompanying this case is an example of the
extent to which the authors have gone in their presentation of a
wealth of historical background. Direct quotations of Presidents
F. D. Roosevelt, Jackson and Lincoln are presented for contrast
and comparison in connection with a discussion on the effect of
the Marbury v. Madison4 decision. The academic value of the first
two chapters far outweighs their practical value.
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is treated in
Chapter III. Although the paucity of the instances permitting
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court also tends to lessen the
importance of this chapter to the average practitioner, it is nevertheless valuable to the student by rounding out his knowledge of
the federal judicial system.
The next chapter deals with the Congressional control of the
3

1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).

4

Id.
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distribution of judicial power among federal and state courts in
federal matters and how Congress exercises its powers. The relationships and comparisons of the judicial power under Article III
and the legislative power under Article I are discussed. The
authors observe, and this reviewer concurs, that although a coextensiveness of the legislative and judicial powers was no doubt
intended by the framers of the Constitution, in some respects,
such as the diversity clause, the judicial power under Article III
appears to be broader than the legislative power under Article I.
This chapter also contains a lengthy but interesting exercise in
dialectics, reminiscent of and as didactically effective as the dialogue between Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus in Plato's Republic.
Chapters V, VI and VII deal with issues and cases of federal
cognizance. The subjects covered include a review of state court
decisions by the Supreme Court, the law applied in civil actions
in the district courts, and the federal question and diversity jurisdiction of the district courts, respectively. These chapters appear
to offer the most practical knowledge for the student and practitioner alike.
The seventh chapter identifies the types of issues that form
a basis for determining which cases should be brought originally
in a federal court.
Process and venue, limitations on jurisdiction, jurisdictional
amount, removal, and conflicts of jurisdiction, which are all general problems of district court jurisdiction, are thoroughly considered in Chapter VIII. This chapter is also of considerable value
to both student and practitioner.
Chapter IX deals with federal government litigation, both
criminal and civil, and actions against the government. A more
detailed treatment of the substance of this chapter at the expense
of curtailing that of earlier chapters would have been welcomed
by this reviewer in view of its increasing importance in every day
practice.
Chapter X covers the all important and often underemphasized
federal habeas corpus remedy and its various ramifications, and
the last chapter is on appellate review of federal decisions and
the certiorari policy. A brief section on statutory development of
appellate review and an interesting address to the American Bar
Association by the late Chief Justice Vinson on the work of the
federal courts supplements.the problems of the Supreme Court
in deciding cases as well as in determining which cases to decide.
In conclusion, Professors Hart and Wechsler have achieved in
this work the aim of many authors by striking a desirable balance
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in their treatment of case and text materials. Neither is over-

emphasized and because of this it should prove acceptable to teacher and student alike. Additionally, by exposing the areas in the
federal judicial system that need improvement, the authors have
accomplished a further service to the public and to their profession.
George Norman*

IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. By Trygve Lie.1 New York: Macmillan, 1954. Pp. xxiv, 473. $6.00. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General
of the United Nations during the first seven hectic years of its
operation, has written a highly interesting account of his experiences. From his autobiographical viewpoint, he relates the story
of international politics as it was played in the international arena
at Lake Success. This generation has been nutured on a daily
diet of crisis topped with tension, and it is in In the Cause of Peace
that we are reminded just how much history has been crowded
into the past seven years. Mr. Lie puts in focus all the major
events which have engaged the interest and concern of the member
state of the United Nations. He exposes to the reader in casual
fashion the part that he played, the confidential conversations he
had with world leaders, and his candid reaction to it all. Of all
the leading characters, Mr. Truman fared best under Mr. Lie's
critical pen. The international achievements of the Truman administration are laudably described although the Secretary-General
deplored United State's action on occasions when it bypassed the
United Nations to go-it-alone.
Trygve Lie was aware of the tremendous part that the first chief
executive officer of any new organization has in establishing the
power relationship and prestige of the position. He was confronted
with the questions that must be answered by all appointed public
administrators-What is the scope of power that goes with the
position and what is the proper area of activity? Now we know
the extent of power of a chief executive officer is often delimited
by the officer himself according to his own interpretation of the
controlling law for we are familiar with strong and weak presidents
under the same Constitution. Lie read in the constitution of the
United Nations a role for the Secretary-General that called for
exercise of broad administrative and policy action. He assumed
a much more active and vital role than his predecessors in the
League of Nations, who had concentrated entirely on administra* Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1

Former Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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tion. Mr. Lie became an international politician as well as an
international administrator and he attempted to induce the U. N.
members to follow certain political courses. In public service,
longevity is a by-product of mere administration for it is usually
only when the public servant figures prominently in policy-making
that he becomes fair game for political snipers. Trygve Lie found
that out for he was denounced by the West as a "Stalin agent" and
by the East as an obsequious tool of the United States. It was his
"political activity" role that incurred the wrath of the U.S.S.R.
and forced Mr. Lie to leave his post under the siege of Soviet blasts.
As chief administrator of the United Nations, Mr. Lie had problems common to all public administrators but with an international
twist. Such an ordinary administrative function as "personnel"
was fraught with unique complications. Staffng the secretariat
with international civil servants caused great concern to the
Secretary-General. Hasty recruitment from employment markets
all over the world was a formidable task. Although the U.N. employees were expected to be international in their job loyalty, Mr.
Lie wanted to be certain that United States nationals were also
loyal Americans. He called upon the United States government for
help but it would not aid him in screening applicants for positions
with the United Nations. According to Secretary of State James
R. Byrnes, the U.S. government "did not wish to appear in any
way to influence . . .selection of personnel or to invade the ex-

clusive responsibilities of the Secretary-General under the Charter."12 The U.N. did not have the machinery nor the funds to
investigate adequately every applicant and some "Fifth Amendment" Americans found their way onto the payroll.
The reckless accusations concerning their national loyalty
hurled at U.N. employees by crusading crucifiers caused Mr. Lie
to reflect on the recent American phenomenon-a passion for
security. In his chapter "The Communist Issue in the Secretariat",
he joins other distinguished foreigners-de Tocqueville, Bryce,
Myrdal-in analyzing the contemporary scene for tree-blinded
Americans and points out the forest of fear which is sadly in need
of thinning. In describing the local climate, the author wrote:
The age of jet propulsion and the atomic bomb stripped away at one
stroke the century-old security from physical attack. At the same
moment the cold war involved the United States as the principal
protagonist against the new imperalism of Soviet Russia, which used
the Communist parties everywhere as instruments of its designs. So
the American people were placed almost without warning in a position to which they were not accustomed, exposed to changes that most
Europeans had long ago learned to accept as facts of life. Now almost
any American city would be exposed to enemy attack in another war,
2 Text at 387.
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almost any home to enemy destruction.
To Americans in this new and unaccustomed mood of insecurity,
even the weak and futile Communist party assumed a new aspect.
Small as it was, they looked upon its members as potential or actual
agents of a hostile power that they knew was capable of inflicting terrible damage on the country if war should come. This is a state of
mind that should be better understood by Europeans and Asians who
are so shocked by what has happened. The obsession with internal
security, and the accompanying hysteria, mark in a sense a last convulsive transition from the youthful, carefree America of the endless
frontier and the happy isolation from 'other people's wars' to the full
maturity of a great world power with all its cares and burdens. 3

If peace-as understood by the Democracies-is to be maintained, there are two tasks which Mr. Lie feels must be vigorously
performed. First, there is in the short run, a containment of the
Soviet Union that must be continued by having sufficient reservoirs of power to checkmate aggressive moves. These should be
developed by defense agreements among the democracies. Secondly, a long range peace program needs to pay increased attention
to the underdeveloped economic areas of the world; for in the
struggle there between Democracy and Communism for the
undecided minds of men, Mr. Lie believes that Communism has
an initial advantage. He is "inclined to feel that Communism, in
its export version, has an even greater first-glance sales appeal
to the perpetually hungry and under privileged in many of these
areas than has the kind of democracy they have come to know
over the year."4
In forecasting the future of the international organization which
he headed, the former Secretary-General holds out a rather pessimistic hope. Although he calls for a constitutional convention to
patch weak spots in the Charter, he does not feel that any significant structural or procedural changes will be forthcoming. He
expects uneasy co-existence to prevail for he concludes:
My own thoughts on Communism, both as a form of government
and as a philosophy of life, do not admit the possibility of a merger
with what we in the West have come to know as democracy. The basic
precepts of the one defy those of the other. In the one, force mediapolice, prisons, concentration camps-have imposed a rule of conformity and have pegged the worth of the individual to his value to
the state and the party. Their interests come first, last, and always.
In the other, the individual-according to accepted philosophy, at
least-is regarded less as a means than as an end unto himself.5

John Gillespie*
3 Id. at 392.
4 Id. at 441.

5 Id. at 437.
* Research Associate, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas.
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JOB PROPERTY RIGHTS. By Arthur R. Porter, Jr.' New York:
King's Crown Press, 1954. Pp. vi, 110. $2.50. This slim volume is
provocative. It is a study of the job control exercised by the
International Typographical Union (I.T.U.). Because of the
I.T.U.'s*extensive authority over composing room jobs, the author
believes it appropriate to think of thege job rights as property
rights.
The book is primarily a description of the job controls exercised
by the LT.U. The author's study is based upon official union interpretations of the I.T.U. general laws and decisions of the executive council of the I.T.U.; admittedly the "law in action" may
vary somewhat from the "law in the books". The Union looks upon
jobs in the composing rooms of the printing industry as theirs.
It is up to the local chapel 2 to provide competent workmen for the
newspaper, book publishing company or printing shops. The foreman of the composing room, always a union member, does the
hiring, laying-off and firing. In hiring and laying-off the foreman
must abide by priority and seniority lists, general laws and
executive council decisions. In firing, the foreman must abide by
I.T.U. general laws concerning bases for discharge. An aggrieved
worker may appeal the foreman's action to the local chapel and
eventually to the executive council of the I.T.U. Basic aspects of
job control are out of the hands of the company and in the hands
of the union.
Porter carefully avoids defining property. Instead he takes
note of various definitions and descriptions of property and
emphasizes that "the core of the concept of property is the system
of relationships among men in regard to economic and social
institutions". 3 This is important because it "explains how it is
possible for intangible relationships not associated directly with
material objects to be termed property".4 Says the author: 5
The right to expect a future income is one of the characteristics
of a property right. An employee with long years of service in a
composing room has an expectation that his income will continue,
barring unforeseen personal events. The situation becomes 'his' in a
sense that is very similar to the ownership of a set of rights in the
use of land which society designates by the term property. The
'owner' of the job even has the right to permit someone else to 'use'
his job through the practice of engaging a substitute. The job is possessed to such a degree that a union mender under certain conditions
1

Hanover College, Hanover, Indiana.

2 Seldom used term for printing shop.
3 Text at 4.

4 Ibid.
5

Text at 63.

NOTRE DANE LAWYER[

[Vol. XXX

may leave his situation for a period of time with the expectation of
returning to it.

The author indicates that the printing industry is not the only
industry in which there is such a thing as job property rights.,
Unions in other industries have gained control over various
aspects of job rights but few, if any, have the extensive control
exercised by the powerful I.T.U.7 The author is of the opinion
that eventually there will probably be more legal control of
job property rights as these rights become more generally recognized." This study is very timely in view of current discussions
about the guaranteed annual wage, in particular, and the over-all
effort, in general, to put jobs on a more stable basis.
Thomas Broden, Jr.*

LAw WRITERS AND THE CouRTs: The Influence of Thomas M.

Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon Upon
American Constitutional Law. By Clyde E. Jacobs. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1954. Pp. vii, 223. $3.50, This
small book is one of the best studies in the field of American
constitutional history and law to appear in recent years. Approximately five hundred state and federal court cases were
analyzed by the writer in gathering evidence to support his
thesis developed in only 167 pages of text. These cases, for the
most part, fall in the period from 1870 to 1910. Unfortunately,
as is true of so many publications today, considerations of economy by the publisher have placed all the notes in a body at the
end of the book. This deplorable practice is always an anguishing
experience to the careful reader and scholar who is almost as
interested in the sources cited and comments contained in the
notes as in the text. There are included an extensive bibliography,
a table of cases cited, and an index which enhances the usability
of the book.
The writer's thesis is that one of the most important (he does
not claim exclusive) influences upon the development of constitutional law in the post-Civil War period was the writings
of constitutional publicists. The writers mainly responsible for
6 Id. at 12 and 69-74.
7 Id. at 69.
8 Id. at 78.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame
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the popularizing of new legal principles among the members of
bar and bench were Cooley, Tiedeman, and Dillon. Their chief
contributions were the establishment of these principles: (1)
liberty of contract as a limitation upon the police power of the
states and the power of the national government to regulate
commerce; and (2) public purpose as a requirement for valid
exercises of the taxing, spending, and eminent domain powers.
These, together with other judicial rationalizations concerning due
process, economic liberty, freedom of contract, equality in the
apportionment of taxes, and just compensation formulated by
jurists, were the doctrines that gave judicial sanctity to a laissezfaire economic order demanded by the conservative, privileged
groups of the new industrial age.
Many other writers have shown various influences on American constitutional development beyond pure legal doctrines and
judicial decisions. Our understanding of this intricate field has
been enhanced by studies showing the influences on constitutional growth of public opinion, of vested interest groups which
have developed techniques of political influence, and the positive
and negative acts and decisions of legislative bodies and executives, as well as court decisions themselves. Mr. Jacobs has filled
in another void by proving conclusively that the above named
publicists were extremely important in formulating the new
doctrines that replaced the earlier traditional reliance on natural
law, common-law principles, and th4 contract clause as guaranties
of property rights.
It appears to the reviewer that the evidence cited better supports the case for the publicists' influence on the state courts
than upon the national Supreme Court. The author does note,
however, that the federal court appeared to lag all along the
line-adopting the new doctrines long after the state courts,
and continuing to rely upon them long after the latter had
abandoned them. Perhaps this suggests the more insulated position of the highest court in the land and its greater ability to
resist public pressure, or perhaps to ignore social and economic
realities. At any rate it does appear that the influence of the
publicists at least indirectly filtered up to the Supreme Court
by the late nineteenth century, and, except for dissents by
Holmes and later by Brandeis, and a few deviations, continued
under the dominance of laissez-faire philosophy until 1937.
The meat of the book is contained in three middle chapters
which develop in great detail the genesis,, development and application of liberty of contract, due process, economic liberty,
and the public purpose maxims. The first chapter on conservative
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principles and liberal reforms before the Civil War appears a
little flimsier because of the complete neglect of Jeffersonian
influence and the glossing over of Hamilton's contributions. The
author's central theme, however, is not lost sight of; and he
merely reviews how "higher law" and natural rights doctrines
were used to protect propertied interests, aided and abetted by
the contract clause of the constitution, as well as by the systemization of the common law. In better historical perspective
is shown the challenge to the old order by Jacksonian democracy
in its attacks on all vested interests, particularly corporations.
Another minor shortcoming in the book is the failure to mention
the watering down of the public interest to the public use doctrine
by Justice Field in 1888 as one of the steps in the establishment
of a laissez-faire constitutional order,' and the further weakening
of legislative regulatory authority by the Minnesota Rate Case
which asserted the right of the judiciary to determine reasonableness of rates by the mumble-jumble of the "fair return on
a fair value doctrine." 2
Mr. Jacobs has made a distinct contribution to the study of
constitutional development. Within the limitations imposed upon
himself he has done an admirable job of assembling the evidence.
One might wish that he had gone further and explained why
these publicists wrote as they did and why their doctrines were
so warmly received by the bar and bench. Was it because of
cumulative effects of the gospel of wealth, the worship of the success of the great entrepreneurs, the importance of the "cult of respectability", the association of lawyers with the same social, economic, and political circles as the industrialists, or evidence of a
blind spot in legal training of that day which made nearly all jurists
illiterate in economic and social realities brought on by the industrial age and completely devoid of a social consciousness?
Certainly the judiciary was more insulated from the pressures
of vested interests than were legislative bodies whose wisdom
was constantly questioned by publicists and courts. In all fairness
it must be said that the writer leaves no doubt as to what he
thinks about the various judicial rationalizations devised to justify
a laissez-faire order which completely ignored realities and frequently social justice as well. When a writer has given us so
much, should a reviewer be picayunish and ask for more?
John L. Harr*
Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 179-80 (1888).
Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457
(1890).
* Professor of History, Chr. of Division of Social Sciences, Northwest
Missouri State College, Maryville. Missouri.
1

2
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MiLITARY LAw. By Daniel Walker.1 New York: Prentice-Hall,

1954. Pp. xiv, 748. $9.75.-For many years military law and military justice have been considered something quite different from
other social expressions of the law. The fact that military law has
always been practiced in the relative segregation of military
communities and that quite naturally only its most sensational
cases have come to the attention of the general public, has
brought about an attitude toward military law which would
make it appear a mysterious and unwholesome system. Lack of
knowledge has led to misunderstanding.
It was not until millions of civilians put on uniforms in World
War II that enough interest was created concerning military
law to make a book on the subject much more than a dust
catcher.
More than ten million soldiers and sailors returned to civilian
pursuits following their World War II service. They took with
them an account of the high-lights of life under military discipline.
Most outstanding in the minds of many were their encounters
with military justice procedures. As a consequence stories concerning courts-martial were most vivid and memorable. As
might be expected, these stories did not suffer in the telling.
In addition to this, many communities had received back some
of their young men as "legal casualtiesL-those discharged as
the result of being convicted of offenses against the military
legal code. People in general were made more aware of military
law. Eventually, some of the ex-soldiers and ex-sailors, especially
the lawyers among their ranks, found themselves elected to
public office or occupying positions wherein their influence resulted in changes to the military legal system.
In the meantime, the standing military force remained relatively
large by pre-war standards. Peacetime conscription made military
service probable for most young men. As a consequence, interest
in the why and how of the military legal system continued to
grow.
The broadening of interest and intelligence concerning the
legal system of the military establishment is the most significant
and noteworthy aspect of the latest developments in military law.
Changes which would have transpired only after a passage of
many years have been remarkably accelerated. Thus in the space
of the last six years we have experienced two major revisions
of the military code.
For the student involved in a course of military law it will be
helpful to examine the beginnings of military social controls in
I Former Commissioner, United States Court of Military Appeals.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXX

order to achieve something of a basic -understanding and perspective of means and purposes. This book by Mr. Walker,
Military Law, begins logically with Nature and Sources of
Military Law. The selection of cases is excellent in this chapter.
However, it would have been preferable to have abbreviated
and edited these cases to a considerable extent and to have
supplied more original text by the author. The text which he
has contributed is good. The teacher using this book can meet
the objection to the length of the first chapter by being selective
in his assignments. There is in this chapter and in Chapter 2,
The Armed Forces, and Chapter 3, Military Criminal Law:
Nature, History and Sources, far too much material for use or
absorption in any but the most protracted course of study.
It is my opinion that the core of this book is to be found in
Chapters 4 through 10, and that it is with these chapters that
professor and student must spend the bulk of their time. Only in
its particulars, only in its details, its procedures and customs does
military law differ from the more generally known civilian
2
systems.
So it is with the practical points of military law that the law
student and lawyer need be concerned. As to basic principles they
will be on familiar ground. There is no fundamental difference
in this day and age between the administration of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice in the military community and the
administration of law in the state and federal jurisdictions. The
quality of American legal systems is always equal to and never
better than its judges and advocates.
Mr. Walker's book is not a practice book; it is a case book, but
2 " . . .we believe Congress intended, in so far as reasonably possible,
to place military justice on the same plane as civilian justice, and to free
those accused by the military from certain vices which infested the old
system. Believing this, we are required to announce principles consistent
therewith.
A cursory inspection of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra,
discloses that Congress granted to an accused the following rights which
parallel those accorded to defendants in civilian courts: To be informed
of the charges against him; to cross-examine witnesses for the government;
to challenge members of the court for cause or peremptorily; to have a
specified number of members compose general and special courts-martial;
to be represented by counsel; not to be compelled to incriminate himself;
to have involuntary confessions excluded from consideration; to have the
court instructed on the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be found guilty of an offense only
when a designated number of members concur in a finding to that effect;
to be sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in the
affirmative; and to have an appellate review." United States v. Clay [No. 49),
1 USCMA 74, 1 CMRI 74, 77-78 (1951).
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as a case book it has value. With the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1951, as a companion volume, Military Law should
fill a need which has been most pronounced in the past. The
student going through the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1951, will not find its terse terms readily understandable,
since it is written with a primary view towards supplying the
active judge advocate with a compilation of practice directives
based mainly on the Uniform Code.3 It has within it only the most
succinct explanations and illustrations. It goes without saying
that military law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
like any other law, does not stand still. It has developed. It is, in
its formative years, extremely dynamic and changing. The reported cases of the United States Court of Military Appeals and
the Boards of Review, those intermediate appellate agencies
(which are the equivalent of the intermediate appellate courts in
a civilian jurisdiction) provided for by the basic law,4 constantly
and steadily interpret the provisions of the Statute (the Uniform
Code) and Executive Order (the Manual). The student or
practitioner who fails to keep constantly abreast of these developments is left in much the same position as a person who
provides himself with the Constitution of the United States but
neglects to examine the untold number of judicial decisions interpreting it. For this reason a case book to be used in combination with the Manual for Courts-Martial,United States, 1951, is
extremely helpful. M/fr. Walker's contribution is in this area.
Following roughly the same scheme of organization as is found
in the Manual for Courts-Martial,United States, 1951, the author
has gathered together and presented in these middle chapters
cases from federal jurisdictions, from the United States Court of
Military Appeals and from the Boards of Review of the different
services. This is no small undertaking, and as of the date of the
completion of such compilation the student would have been
provided with a completely adequate case book. However, because of the rapid flow of case law coming from the appellate
levels in the military legal system, it will be necessary either
for supplements to be published to this book up-dating the cases
it contains or for the user to keep himself current by securing, as
they are published, the new decisions of the military appellate
tribunals. An attempt has been made in the Air Force in this
direction by the publication of an annual supplement5 intended
to keep, within yearly limits, comparatively recent information
a 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-741 (1952).
4 Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice.
5 Annotation to ManuA~ for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, United

States Air Force Annual Pocket Part, 1953.
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available to the users of the Manual. Even on a yearly basis this
does not provide a satisfactory body of case law for the judge
advocate or civilian lawyer actively occupied with the trial or
appeal of courts-martial. It is necessary for these lawyers to
resort to the advance sheets containing the latest reported
decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals and the
several Boards of Review.
For teaching purposes, I consider this book to be a worthwhile
contribution. Beyond that, the material found in the first three
chapters, reference to which has been made, as well as the
material contained in Chapters 12 through 19, is an excellent
body of source material. Especially in the latter chapters is
found material which has been relatively unavailable to the researcher and has not often been placed in such understandable
context as that employed by Mr. Walker in this book. It is unlikely that this material can be much more than touched upon
by the average professor and student in a course in military
law, and it would be my advice to use it merely as a supplement
to the Manual for Courts-Martialand devote more time to the
procedures involved in courts-martial, their trial, review and
appeal.
With these cautions in mind, I recommend Military Law to
teachers and students of law as an ambitious work of scholarship,
and I note with regret that Mr. Walker's textual contributions
are much too brief since those which I have examined have been
found to be really valuable. Perhaps if Mr. Walker ventures
again in the field of military legal publications he will find it
possible to include more of his original text.
Reginald C. Harmon*

SUPREMIE COURT PRACTICE

SECOND

EDmoN-1954 RuLEs. By

Robert L. Stern' and Eugene Gressman 2. Washington, D.C.: The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1954 Pp. xv, 585. $10.50.
On April 12, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States
promulgated the Revised Rules effective July 1, 1954. The second
edition of Supreme Court Practice, first published in 1950, was
ready shortly thereafter. This edition reflects the changes in the
* Major General, U.S.A.F. The Judge Advocate General, United States
Air Force.
I Formerly Acting Solicitor General of the United States.
2
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Rules and includes pertinent cases and other materials since 1950.
The first edition of the book was widely acclaimed.3 The second
edition calls for a repeat performance. For, here is a work that
is both scholarly and eminently practical. It spells out in detail
the steps involved in handling a case before the highest tribunal
of the land, and furnishes leading and recent authorities on the
subject of the Court's jurisdiction and procedure. The book is
intended for the legal profession, but it is so readable that a
non-lawyer would find it enjoyable (and lawyers would, contrary to custom, probably read it from cover to cover). The
experienced practitioner before the Supreme Court will find
it useful; the lawyer new to the Court should deem it indispensable.
The first chapter is entitled "Introduction to the Supreme
Court", and it is just that. The reader is told where the Court is,
what it consists of, when the term begins, etc. He is then acquainted with the various facilities of the Court, such as the
Library, which contains 173,000 volumes and transcripts of
records to all Supreme Court cases since 1832 and all briefs
since 1854; the Clerk's Office, which "is the unfailingly courteous
and helpful source of information as to all questions of Supreme
Court procedure"; 4 the Marshall's Office, where arrangements
can be made for the sitting of counsel's wife or relatives in
special and preferable locations on the day when counsel argues
in Court; and the facilities furnished by the Reporter of Decisions
and Opinions. In this chapter the authors also note the Constitutional basis for the Court's jurisdiction and briefly explain
the "sifting process" whereby every case coming to the Supreme
Court is subjected to a preliminary scrutiny to determine whether any further action by the Court is warranted.5
The next two chapters are devoted to the Court's jurisdiction
to review decisions of Federal courts and its jurisdiction to
review the decisions of State courts. Then the authors set out
in helpful detail the procedures involved in the two principal
methods of bringing cases to the Supreme Court-certiorari and
appeal. The importance of the chapters dealing with certiorarP
cannot be overestimated. Each year 80-90 per cent of petitions
for certiorari are denied by the Court.7 This fact alone would
prompt a careful reading of the section of the book devoted
3
No less than eighteen law journals contained a review of the book.
Text at 6.
5 Id. atll.
6 Chs. IV and V.
7 Text at 106.
4
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to the factors motivating the granting of certiorari.8 In connection with their discussion of the certiorari procedure, the
authors stress the point that the petitions for certiorari should
be short.9 The draughtsman of a petition should bear this in
mind, for on several occasions the Court has denied petitions

because they were too long.10
As to the appeal procedure under the new Rules, the authors

state that it conforms closely to the certiorari procedure, and
that the "result has been to eliminate a good deal of the mystery
from Supreme Court practice."" Prior to the new Rules the
procedure governing appeals followed an archaic pattern. Numerous documents were required to be filled with the lower
court from which the appeal was taken. Now all the appellant
need file are two documents, namely, (1) a notice of appeal,
including a designation of the portions of the record to be certified
and the questions presented, and (2) a jurisdictional statement
akin to a petition for certiorari.
The book is also concerned with the procedures in cases coming
before the Supreme Court by certificate, those arising under
the Court's original jurisdiction, and in cases involving extraordinary writs. There are also chapters on briefs, oral argument,
petitions for rehearing, motions, loss of jurisdiction by mootness
or abatement, and admission to the Bar and disbarment. All of
these chapters are informative and reflect sound scholarship and
practical knowledge which characterize the whole book. The
authors' insistence that the oral argument "should attempt to
convince the court as a matter of reason and principle" 12 is
laudable. As they point out, the Court considers that the argument is an "oral discussion"."s The suggestions made in respect
to briefs are helpful, and the emphasis there is also on arguing
"reason and principles" in the argument portion of the brief."4
Fully 70 pages of the book are devoted to forms used in the
practice before the Court. These are very useful, particularly
to the inexperienced attorneys. The full text of the 1954 Rules is
included in the back of the book, and these Rules are indexed
by subject matter for speedy reference. The Table of Cases is
another salutary feature of the volume, providing a ready means
8 Id. at 106-141.

9 Id. at 204.
10

Id.

11 Id. at 226.
12 Id. at 334.
"3 Id. at 340, quoting Chief Justice Hughes.
'4 Id. at 308.
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of finding the many cases cited in the text.
The valuable legal materials and the experienced "know-how"
which are to be found within the covers of this book should do
much more than "keep most lawyers out of trouble," as the
authors modestly note. 5 The knowledge gained from a careful
reading of Supreme Court Practiceshould go a long way toward
helping lawyers achieve success in their practice before the
Supreme Court.
Louis C. Kaplan*

''
*

Id. at 1.
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